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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the 
Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to 
carry out research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and 
vulnerability is exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms 
one element in a broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide 
the full documentation of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not 
confirmed. It also aims to analyse the processes through which such impacts occur 
and the circumstances which exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a 
practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and policy 
recommendations to donor government agencies. 
 
This report on Sierra Leone is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies are 
available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon secondary data 
sources including existing research studies, reports and evaluations commissioned by 
operational agencies, and early warning and survey data where this has been 
available. These secondary sources have been complemented by primary research 
interviews with government officers, aid policymakers and practitioners, researchers 
and members of the local population. The author would like to thank Tunde Zack-
Williams for comments made on an earlier draft. The analysis and opinions expressed 
in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or 
policy of DFID or the UK government. 
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Executive summary 
 
This study examines the impact of armed violence and small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) on poverty in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone was selected as an internal conflict 
case study for comparison with other forms of armed violence analysed in the other 
AVPI case studies. Sierra Leone also represents an interesting case study in that it has 
been subject to extensive external programming to address SALW possession/usage, 
and also some atypical outcomes that resulted from armed violence and SALW usage.  
 
Armed violence context 
The conflict involved the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) movement, civil 
defence forces (CDF), the national army, neighbouring counties and also the 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the 
UN, the UK and mercenary/private security forces. SALW played a significant part in 
the duration and intensity of the conflict – for example enabling the RUF to sustain 
the conflict for 11 years with only a few thousand combatants. However, traditional 
weapons and implements also played a significant part in the conflict being used for 
community protection, for example, and many deaths/atrocities were committed with 
them rather than SALW. Further, most civilians did not acquire SALW during the 
conflict.  
 
SALW possession 
Sierra Leone prior to the conflict did not have a weapons problem nor a gun culture. 
During the conflict unknown quantities of guns passed through the country. Weapons 
were supplied by and through neighbouring countries. Western governments and arms 
dealers also supplied combatants. However, this has not resulted in widespread 
weapons display or possession post-conflict. Most civilians did not acquire SALW 
during the conflict. Extensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
and SALW programming collected some weapons (over 70,000 in the formal DDR 
process) but arms caches, domestic weapons, weapons for sale, and easily accessible 
regional supplies mean ready access to weapons exists. Arms embargoes proved 
ineffective. Nevertheless, the carrying, display, or the use of arms, and the incidence 
of armed criminality have not risen significantly post-conflict, and there is an aversion 
to guns amongst much of the population. 
 
Insecurity and SALW 
The possession/use of SALW created high levels of rural and urban insecurity, 
particularly in the absence of state protection, which had drastic impoverishing 
effects. The RUF typically used SALW to lay siege to communities, to extort goods 
and labour from civilians, to seize recruits and for plunder and pillaging to sustain the 
conflict and for personal enrichment. They were also used for revenge, humiliation 
and other ‘psychological’ purposes, especially against women and children. The CDF, 
which had fewer SALW, tended to use them for community defence, to establish 
control over communities, and for combating RUF, as well as personal and group 
enrichment. While army units and ECOMOG forces used SALW to fight the rebels 
and sometimes to rob and intimidate communities and also for personal and group 
enrichment. The impact of these uses on Sierra Leone was catastrophic with many 
communities becoming totally insecure with few supplies coming in, few viable 
livelihoods, food shortages, and no form of protection. However, in some 
communities CDF and government forces managed to maintain forms of community 
security and development. And ultimately, it was the use of SALW and other 
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weapons by the CDF, and the Kamajors in particular, and external forces, that enabled 
the RUF to be defeated and armed violence terminated.   
 
Negative poverty impacts 
 
Economic activities 
Declining GDP and other macro economic indicators. The impact of armed violence 
and SALW usage on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be directly traced to conflict 
incidences. The coup by SALW armed army elements in May 1997, for example, led 
to real GDP plunging 20% in 1997. Retarded GDP damaged the government’s 
capacity to deliver social services. In periods of relative peace GDP rose. However, 
GDP has yet to fully recover. Further, key industries on which Sierra Leone depended 
were damaged by armed violence. The RUF closures of mines and industries at 
gunpoint also impacted directly upon the rural poor who were dependent on them for 
income.  
 
Infrastructure destruction and trade 
Destruction of houses and robbery impoverished most civilians. The majority of 
householders had their houses destroyed or were evicted at gunpoint in conflict zones 
and they lost many possessions. Displacement often made civilians dependent on 
subsistence strategies. Many households are yet to recover. 
Sieges impoverished communities. SALW-armed rebels cut off the supplies to many 
towns and villages by shooting or intimidating lorry drivers seeking to keep roads 
open and feed starving civilians, or by burning their lorries. Many people in besieged 
towns were impoverished or even starved and communities have yet to fully recover. 
Many lorry drivers lost their lorries, their means of livelihoods, and are without work. 
Patterns of trade/transportation negatively changed. The violence changed trading 
patterns in that communities and markets that formerly had trading links could no 
longer trade because of the dangers of armed violence. Post-conflict the old patterns 
of trade have not necessarily been renewed.  
 
Food security and agriculture 
Lost livelihoods. Farmers lost their livelihoods as they were too fearful of armed 
combatants to farm, or left their homes to join the CDF. Further, they were often 
robbed and their equipment destroyed.  
Declines in nutrition. SALW attacks on civilians in towns such as Makeni and Bo 
forced many to flee into the bush and to survive on ‘bush’ products. Many suffered 
from malnutrition or were ill and unable to work or support their families. 
Changed patterns of agriculture. Rice farmers risked being shot, mutilated or abducted 
and output slumped. Limited farming of root crops took its place, but this was less 
nutritious. Following the conflict, rice production still has not recovered and prices 
have rocketed. 
 
Social Services 
Destruction of supplies/infrastructure. Schools and hospitals were destroyed by 
SALW-armed rebels curtailing or seriously hampering the delivery of social services.  
Education opportunities curtailed/lost employment opportunities. Many children and 
youths missed the key years of their education either because they were combatants or 
they were prevented from attending schools because of armed violence. And many 
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have been unable to find employment post-conflict, in part, because they are 
frequently perceived as unemployable. 
Social service professionals impoverished. The shooting, mutilation and intimidation 
of teachers and others in the social services reduced many to the level of the long-
term poor. 
Declines in health. Disease accelerated with the deepening of armed violence with no 
real provision of drugs or safe water. Population movements, over-crowding, and poor 
sanitary conditions stimulated by armed violence further exacerbated disease 
outbreaks. The poor health of many Sierra Leoneans pushed, and continues to push, 
many further into poverty. 
 
Social capital 
Social capital declined damaging support networks. Violence committed with SALW 
and other weapons within both urban and rural settings seriously undermined trust, 
reciprocity and networks. Social transactions that traditionally provided some sort of 
safety net for the impoverished were damaged. Neighbours robbed each other, many 
poor took the opportunity to rob the rich, and traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms were eroded in places such as Freetown in 1997-8 where armed violence 
became routine in certain areas of the city. Declines in social capital seem to have 
hampered recovery. 
 
Vulnerable groups 
Women impoverished. Women were targeted by armed combatants and attacked, 
raped, used as sex slaves or spies, and taken as ‘bush wives’, among other things. 
Once raped they often suffered poor health and were frequently unable to re-marry 
into the community. Many became dependent upon petty trading to survive and 
slipped deeper into poverty.  
Children, youth and disabled disadvantaged. Many disabled were left to fend for 
themselves during the conflict and sunk further into poverty. Youths sometimes 
managed to enrich themselves during the conflict through armed robbery, but this has 
not generally been sustained following the end of the conflict and sustainable 
employment is elusive. Most child ex-combatants are now working in the diamond 
mine fields of Kono or Tongo. 
 
Armed robbery/criminality 
Civilians impoverished/some combatants enriched. A goal of armed violence was to 
plunder and civilians were robbed of their possessions at gunpoint. Government 
buildings were also looted or destroyed. Some combatants, government officials, and 
outsiders with a stake in the conflict enriched themselves and have not subsequently 
been called to account. 
Post-conflict concerns. There is a creeping concern about security in some districts 
where drugs and anti-social behaviour are increasing. And outbreaks of armed 
robbery and violence by impoverished individuals in some communities are already 
on the increase.   
 
Population movements 
Movement from rural to urban areas. Many of the displaced moved from the 
countryside to urban areas but have failed to find sustainable livelihoods. Their 
absence has also impacted upon rural communities denying them skills and expertise 
and adding to impoverishment. Civilians who fled Sierra Leone for neighbouring 
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countries have frequently been abused and have found it hard to find viable 
livelihoods on returning. 
 
Other SALW-related impacts 
Community protection/development. SALW possession enabled some communities to 
defend themselves. Ultimately, it was the use of SALW and other weapons by the  
CDF and external forces, including the British, that enabled the RUF to be defeated 
and armed violence terminated. Further, in some CDF-held areas SALW protection 
enabled livelihoods to be maintained.  
Absence of a post-conflict weapons culture. A consequence of SALW usage has been 
the emergence in civil society of an aversion to weapons. The display, possession and 
usage of SALW is generally regarded as unacceptable. This potentially has reined in 
armed violence and its capacity to disrupt recovery. Sierra Leone has not become a 
militarised society/state.  
No significant rises in post-conflict armed violence. The use/possession of SALW 
during the conflict has not led to significant surges in post-conflict armed violence, 
unlike many other conflicts, despite rising poverty. Key factors explaining this may 
include a reaction/revulsion to armed violence in Sierra Leone, increased sensitisation 
by civil society on the dangers of SALW, and also the presence of international 
military forces and a strengthened police.  
Some groups/individuals became less poor. Changing trading patters benefited some 
traders. They shifted trade to neighbouring countries, for example. This has brought 
financial benefits. Employment in service industries in Freetown has increased. 
However, there are fears this may not be sustainable as internationals leave Sierra 
Leone.  
 
Implications for programming 
Shortfalls in programming. The programming undertaken in Sierra Leone to address 
weapons issues during the conflict did not fully collect SALW or prevent renewed 
outbreaks of conflict until late on. Weapon supplies into Sierra Leone were not 
curtailed, and remain largely open. Neither have appropriate or sustainable livelihoods 
being found for a number of ex-combatants. Vulnerable groups were also neglected. 
Civilian concerns tended to be neglected in favour of those of ex-combatants. 
Subsequent follow-up SALW programming has addressed some of these concerns. 
However, the underlying causes of conflict that underpinned weapons acquisition, 
such as youth marginalisation, poor governance, remain despite being targeted by 
developmental programming. Nevertheless, an international presence still underpins 
security in Sierra Leone and acts as deterrent to weapons possession, display and 
usage. Whether non-violence can be maintained when the international presence 
diminishes or terminates remains open to question. 
 
Responding to SALW possession/usage. The experience of Sierra Leone suggests that 
the following elements may usefully be integrated into future programming: 
 Community security and confidence-building. Unprotected communities 
particularly suffered the consequences of SALW and were impoverished. This 
implies the need for appropriately trained police and army contingents 
(through SSR) that fulfil their duty to protect civilians and communities and 
that are deployed nationwide. In Sierra Leone this has been a post-conflict 
priority, but has not as yet been achieved. 
 International/regional SALW controls. Improved international and regional 
controls over licit and illicit arms transfers to conflict zones. 
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 Improved border patrols to combat illicit trafficking of SALW. 
 Comprehensive regional/localised arms collection. The latter needs to 
particularly target civilian weapons. Regionally co-ordinated arms collection 
programmes are vital to avert the intensification or potential resurgence of 
armed violence through intra-regional arms circulations. 
 More targeted interventions to secure livelihoods for ex-combatants. 
Opportunities/needs assessments are particularly important in relation to this. 
 Build upon civil society capacities to reverse gun cultures and the 
militarization of communities/societies. Civil society and locals have the best 
understanding of how armed violence comes about and the capacity to engage 
with it through traditional mechanisms. This needs to be built upon. In Sierra 
Leone, community re-acceptance of ex-combatants has been high, despite the 
atrocities that have been committed. DDR and other forms of programming 
still do not fully engage with the capacities of locals to reverse the 
militarization of communities, although arms for development programming is 
making progress in this area. 
 Identify and target vulnerable groups. Vulnerable groups such as the disabled, 
children, and women were not adequately provided for in much DDR and 
associated programming. They continue to be disadvantaged three years after 
the ending of the conflict and need continuing or further support. 
 National legislation/small arms regulation. Further measures are required in 
this area to ensure that controls on small arms keep pace with potentially 
rising levels of arms criminality and outbreaks of armed violence. 
 Root causes of weapons acquisition need to be addressed. Sierra Leone shows 
that the targeting of conflict triggers, such as poor governance and exclusion, 
are vital. 
 Promoting participatory programming. In Sierra Leone, much SALW/DDR 
and other programming has typically been externally-driven. This has 
contributed to the government failing to take responsibility and ownership for 
taking Sierra Leone forward in addressing armed violence and poverty issues. 
At the same time, Sierra Leone institutions have not generally proved effective 
in taking the lead on this. Nevertheless, participatory programming is vital. 
Civil society organisations may be a good point of entry to enhance 
participatory programming. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Case study rationale 
 
SALW in the possession of certain individuals, groups and militaries have the 
capacity to create or contribute to intense insecurity and violence and to damage 
development and impoverish. However, documenting and demonstrating SALW 
impacts and the precise ways and processes through which they create insecurity and 
impoverish, is an area where there has been only limited policy and research work. 
Further, linking this to programming and seeking to establish how SALW and armed 
violence impacts might be alleviated, mitigated, or prevented through appropriate and 
timely initiatives that take into account armed violence similarly has not been fully 
thought through. 
 
This case study, in common with other AVPI case studies, seeks through amassing 
data through field and desk work to start to address some of these gaps in knowledge 
and policy with the objective of arriving at new understandings of the impacts of 
armed violence and SALW on poverty. This case study examines the recent conflict 
and the post-conflict phases in Sierra Leone – selected as an indicative study of an 
African civil war – and seeks to establish whether in Sierra Leone SALW 
possession/usage and armed violence have had the types of negative impacts that 
recent research and policy work suggests occurs when SALW are introduced into 
conflictual environments. Other case studies in the AVPI examine differing contexts 
of armed violence (such as criminal gangs in urban settings) to see if they arrive at 
similar or differing conclusions.  
 
1.2 Why do SALW represent a security/poverty challenge? 
 
Policy and research work in the field of SALW is relatively new. SALW only became 
an articulated and mainstreamed area of research and policy in the mid-1990s 
following the ending of the Cold War when major weapons systems – such as 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and tanks and aircraft  – were seen as the prime 
focus of international attention and SALW of secondary interest. Further, it has been 
only in the past few years that SALW has started to be looked at as a development as 
well as a security challenge.  
 
Notwithstanding this, preliminary research and data in this area has emerged and 
recent analysis of SALW tends to coalesce around a set of generally-accepted 
assumptions, not least that SALW create patterns of insecurity which have negative 
direct and indirect impacts on development and in turn on poverty. SALW are seen as 
presenting a particular challenge in that they are said to play a significant role in 
triggering, compounding, and lengthening the lethality, scale, and consequences of 
armed conflict and social violence.1 The UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms in its 1997 Report noted that the availability of these weapons contributes 
towards exacerbating conflicts by increasing the lethality and duration of violence, by 
encouraging a violent rather than a peaceful resolution of differences, and by 
generating a vicious circle of insecurity, which in turn leads to a greater demand for, 
                                                 
1 UNDP, August 2001, p. 8. 
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and use of, small arms.2 It is suggested that SALW have strong social ramifications 
and make the ability to kill, more than ever before, a utilitarian act, restrained neither 
by age or gender.3 This leads to the militarisation of society and the acceptance of 
weapons as a normal part of life and of violent conflict as an everyday occurrence.4  
 
These ramifications in terms of insecurity are, in part, said to stem from the technical 
characteristics of SALW which are: 
 
 easily concealed;  
 cheap and easy to acquire;  
 easily used by non-expert civilians and groups;  
 more deadly than other readily available weapons (such as clubs and knives); 
 designed to have lethal killing capacity including the means to kill quickly at a 
distance, with little strength, determination or effort.  
 
SALW-induced insecurity and armed violence is said to contribute negatively to the: 
 
 erosion of social capital; 
 disruption of economic activities;  
 reductions in revenue and savings;  
 the diminishing of access to social services, which are also likely to decline in 
quality;  
 a rise in armed criminality;  
 an environment where external humanitarian and developmental assistance is 
likely to be impeded.5   
 
These, combined with additional hypotheses internally-generated within the AVPI, 
will be utilised as the indicators and baselines for the purposes of analysis in this case 
study.  
 
1.3  Why Sierra Leone? 
 
Sierra Leone was selected as a SALW case study for the following reasons. First, the 
conflict in Sierra Leone (see Box 1, page 9, for a brief description of the conflict) has 
indicative characteristics of internal conflicts not only in Africa but globally, such as: 
a weak state, external regional and international intervention, impoverishment, 
inequality, poor governance, and a rebel movement that sought to overthrow existing 
structures and the government through the use of SALW and armed violence. This 
may allow the findings to have generic relevance in other internal conflicts and post-
conflict contexts where donors are engaged in addressing armed violence and its 
impacts. 
 
Second, Sierra Leone has been the target for extensive developmental programming 
seeking directly or indirectly to deal with the consequences of armed violence and 
SALW possession and usage both during and following the conflict. This provides a 
basis for the case study to reflect on the extent to which armed violence and SALW 
                                                 
2 Michael T. Klare, 1999, p. 16. 
3 Christopher Louise, March 1995, p. 10. 
4 Christopher Louise, March 1995,  p. 14. 
5 See Small Arms Survey, 2003, Chapter 4, especially p. 131. And Muggah and Berman, July 2001. 
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have been factored into and dealt with in an effective manner in programming, both in 
terms of stand-alone SALW-related programmes, and through poverty reduction 
programming more broadly.  
 
Third, considerable numbers of SALW were fed into Sierra Leone as part of a 
deliberate process of igniting the conflict, sustaining it, and at the same time for 
defending the state and to avert the rebels taking control of Sierra Leone. However, 
Sierra Leone did not suffer the numbers of weapons that were inserted into other 
African ‘Cold War’ conflicts such as Angola, Somalia and Mozambique.  
 
Fourth, sufficient data is available from Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL), 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and other international organisations on SALW and 
developmental indicators to make some reasonably informed assumptions as to the 
impact of SALW, although there are still gaps in data and knowledge.  
 
Fifth, initial desk research and prior field research undertaken prior to the AVPI 
suggested that there were some unusual outcomes associated with armed violence in 
Sierra Leone, such as the seeming development of an antipathy to SALW display, 
possession and usage across broad swathes of society following the conflict, and few 
signs of significantly rising incidences of armed violence post-2002. However, it was 
also apparent that although Sierra Leone on the face of it presents a picture of a 
largely gun-free post-conflict society, the capacity for a renewal of supply appears to 
be disturbingly straightforward; not least through hidden arms in Sierra Leone and 
regional networks.  
 
Last, a year after the end of the conflict, poverty in Sierra Leone accelerated posing 
the question of whether this was a delayed impact, after an initial recovery, of armed 
violence and SALW usage, or could be attributed primarily to other factors.  
 
1.4  Research challenges 
 
It is not a straightforward task to establish direct links between the introduction of 
SALW into communities/areas and subsequent changes in terms of impoverishment.  
 
First, SALW are one of a number of variables that impact upon poverty. 
Disentangling SALW from other poverty-inducing impacts, such as poor governance, 
external conditionalities, social discontent and so on, is difficult. However, a starting 
point is to suggest that SALW have specific and distinctive security impacts that 
particularly impact, directly or indirectly, on development and impoverishment. 
 
Second, specific data on SALW impacts are scarce. Few researchers have undertaken 
research in this area and those that have tend to prefer to focus on the impacts of 
violence or conflict rather than SALW.  
 
Third, many people interviewed in the field, and elsewhere, found it difficult or were 
unwilling to distinguish SALW impacts. They tended to see the person behind armed 
violence or the tactics of various groups as the critical focus point, not the weapons. 
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Box 1: Outline of the civil conflict in Sierra Leone 
 
In 1991 a civil conflict broke out in Sierra Leone that was to last 11 years and devastate the 
country. A country that had been among the poorest in the world was made even poorer by 
the civil conflict that introduced considerable quantities of SALW into the country with 
profound impacts upon Sierra Leone and its people including the displacement of up to half of 
the country’s population. At its height in 1998, between 60,000-80,000 combatants were 
involved in Sierra Leone out of a population of about 4.5m. A definitive figure for the 
numbers of people killed during the conflict has not been arrived at but the most commonly 
cited figure is 50,000 deaths. Diamonds became the main source of funding for the conflict in 
its later stages.  
 
The conflict broke out in March 1991 when RUF combatants moved from Liberia into eastern 
Sierra Leone. The invading force was comprised of only 300 fighters and included 
mercenaries from Burkina Faso and forces from Charles Taylor’s NPFL.  The invasion and 
subsequent armed violence was underpinned to a large extent by Charles Taylor’s desire to 
destabilise Sierra Leone and, in particular to secure the withdrawal of Sierra Leone troops 
from the ECOMOG peace operation in Liberia; to exploit revenues from Sierra Leone’s 
diamond production; and to install the RUF in power in Sierra Leone.  
 
However, the RUF developed a momentum of its own and grew as it forcibly abducted 
recruits and sought to recruit on the basis of its revolutionary ideology to overthrow the 
existing order. As they advanced throughout early 1991, RUF/NPFL forces abducted 
civilians, killed them, or forced them to carry looted property and perform domestic tasks. 
The burning of civilian residences and the targeting of government and traditional authorities, 
along with the violence against civilians, caused massive panic and an exodus of civilians 
northwards and inland. There were also individuals who identified themselves with the 
‘revolutionary rhetoric’ of the movement and joined willingly. 
 
The state was ineffective in its attempts to defend Sierra Leone against RUF armed violence 
and was compelled to draw upon the assistance of ECOMOG and other external actors. 
Further, elements of the army allied themselves with the RUF at certain points and seized the 
opportunity to enrich themselves and abuse civilians. Elements of the military staged a coup 
under Valentine Strasser and the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was 
established and negotiated with the rebels who by 1995 had advanced within 20 miles of the 
capital, Freetown. With the help of the private security company, Executive Outcomes (EO), 
and Kamajor civil defence forces, the rebels were driven back, but a palace coup deposed 
Strasser in 1996. Elections were held in 1996 when Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected 
president but he was not recognised by the RUF and fighting resumed. With RUF fortunes in 
decline the Abidjan Accord was signed in November 1996 but anticipated peacekeeping 
forces to implement it did not materialise.  
 
Another military coup was staged in 1997 with rebels and the Sierra Leone army forming the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under Johnny Paul Koroma and Kabbah went 
into exile in neighbouring Guinea. The UN Security Council imposed an oil and arms 
embargo on Sierra Lone in response and ECOMOG blockaded Freetown and attacked junta 
positions. By February 1998, Kabbah was back in power and the UN Observer Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNOMIL) was deployed. However, hopes that the RUF would fade away were 
not realised and with backing from Burkina Faso and Liberia it started to make significant 
military inroads across the country. Further, Nigeria was seeking to withdraw from its 
commitment to Sierra Leone and was no longer prepared to shoulder the costs of its 
engagement. The government signed the Lomé Accord in July 1999 which was underpinned 
by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeeping force. 
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However, the RUF continued to fight in parts of the countryside and the RUF was reluctant to 
allow UNAMSIL entry into diamond producing areas that it controlled. Events came to a 
head in May 2000 when the RUF took 500 peacekeepers hostage. This triggered a firmer 
military response from the UK and UMAMSIL. UK forces freed hostages taken by the rebel 
West Side Boys outside Freetown and decimated them as fighting force. The rebels were no 
longer able, or willing, to continue the conflict and in November 2000 the Abuja cease-fire 
was signed. During 2001, the dismantling of the RUF as a fighting force gathered pace 
through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and in January 2002 the 
conflict was declared officially over. Elections took place in May 2002. 
 
2. The context of armed violence and SALW possession and usage in 
Sierra Leone 
 
Sierra Leone was by no means a gun-free state prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 
1991. However, it did not have a culture of armed violence where SALW were widely 
distributed or used within society. Traditional rites and practices in Sierra Leone, for 
example, were not centred on weapons as in some other countries and although 
hunting weapons were part of rural life they were used mainly for hunting and crop 
protection. While Sierra Leone had, and continues to have, a network of blacksmiths 
producing hunting weapons these were largely for their own communities and were 
used for hunting and there appears to be little trafficking of these weapons across 
communities or regions. Armed criminality was relatively low prior to the conflict 
and the state, despite its repressive nature over a number of decades prior to the 
conflict, did not habitually use armed violence against its citizens or neighbouring 
states on a large scale as in some other African states, although atrocities were 
committed against civilians.  
 
The national army was small and poorly funded and equipped with military hardware. 
It had few SALW. Further, Sierra Leoneans in the main regarded themselves as a 
pacific people who settled disputes by traditional non-violent means within the 
community.   
 
This was to change with the entry of several hundred SALW-armed RUF combatants 
into the east in 1991. From this point, SALW moved into Sierra Leone supplied by, or 
through neighbouring states, arms dealers, and northern states. Definitive figures as to 
how many SALW passed through Sierra Leone during the conflict are not available, 
but the quantities were small compared to many other African conflicts such as in 
Somalia, Angola and Mozambique. Most civilians did not acquire SALW during the 
conflict – either because they could not afford them or because they were not 
available – the army was poorly supplied, and the civil defence forces (CDF) that 
sprung up had to rely, particularly in the early days, on a few shotguns and any 
weapons they had captured. Many CDF were armed with sticks, clubs and machetes. 
However, the RUF was relatively well-armed with SALW such as assault rifles that 
enabled them at times to exert an impact out of proportion to their small numbers. The 
RUF only numbered several thousand at the height of the conflict. 
 
2.1  External supplies 
 
It is highly unlikely that the RUF could have sustained its military campaign without 
direct assistance in acquiring SALW and military assistance from Liberia and other 
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neighbouring states. This prolonged the conflict and contributed to the suffering of the 
population and the retardation of development.  
 
Taylor’s assistance to the RUF was initially described as quite limited and was low on 
small arms and ammunition but there was a steady flow of small arms from Liberia to 
the RUF throughout much of the conflict.6 The RUF was also supplied with arms by 
or from Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Libya. 
Libya provided training to the rebels and it is believed to have supplied weapons to 
the rebels. Cote d’Ivoire at various points during the conflict provided safe sanctuary 
and passage was provided for war materiel to the NPFL, for example.  
 
The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was not well armed at the onset of the civil war. The 
army had few weapons, and those it had were in poor condition, including its small 
arms.7 Just prior to the outbreak of the civil war, the government concluded an 
agreement with China in 1990 and procured AK-47s and machine guns with the latter 
shipment arriving in the first half of 1991.8  
 
However, with the outbreak of conflict, arms availability did increase in the first few 
months of the conflict. Further, the army was increased to around double its size and 
had reached perhaps 5,000 soldiers by April 1992. However, it never managed to 
effectively defend the population across the country from the RUF, irregular army 
units, and foreign forces that used SALW to intimidate, terrorise, displace and rob 
civilians. 
 
Subsequently, the government, and the various army factions that staged coups, 
sought to increase their SALW holdings through private security companies, and 
through western states such as Italy. Following the amendment of UN sanctions in 
1998, the UK became the biggest arms supplier to Sierra Leone. It was announced in 
October 1999 that the UK would be providing the government with 132 light machine 
guns (with 2m rounds of ammunition), 7,500 rifles, and 24 mortars with 2,000 rounds 
of ammunition.9  
 
2.2  Internal circulation of SALW 
 
The relative shortage of SALW in Sierra Leone led all the parties to seek to capture, 
buy, or acquire SALW. Although relatively well armed, the RUF also actively sought 
to capture or acquire SALW from the army, ECOMOG, and the UN. The RUF, for 
example, took on weapons that the army had abandoned and SLA troops sometimes 
sold their weapons to the RUF. Similarly, the RUF seized or bought weapons from 
ECOMOG troops, particularly in 1998 as the rebels advanced on Freetown. National 
contingents of UNAMSIL on a number of occasions in the late 1990s also 
surrendered, or sold, weapons to the RUF.  
 
The AFRC was said to have received weapons, including SALW from the RUF.10 In 
its joint attacks with the RUF on civilians the AFRC also deliberately abandoned 
                                                 
6 Eric Berman, December 2000, p. 14. 
7 Eric Berman, December 2000, p. 20. 
8 Eric Berman, December 2000, p. 20-21. 
9 Eric Berman, December 2000, p. 23. 
10 Eric Berman, December 2000, p. 22-23. 
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weapons that could be later ‘collected’ by the RUF, or sold them to the rebel group. 
However, CDF although supplied at various points by, for example, the SLA and EO, 
frequently had to rely on ambushes of the RUF to arm themselves.  
 
2.3  Security impacts of SALW introduction/possession 
 
It was suggested earlier that SALW potentially contribute to patterns and cycles of 
insecurity and to the lengthening, lethality, and scale of armed violence with potential 
poverty impacts. It was also suggested that the acquisition of SALW by some groups 
are likely to trigger reactive arms acquisition by others (a form of ‘arms racing’), 
further increasing levels of insecurity.  
 
In Sierra Leone, as in some other internal conflicts, it is difficult to establish 
conclusively to what extent SALW contributed to the scale and lethality of conflicts. 
In conflicts such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the vast majority of fatalities were 
committed with non-SALW hardware. In Sierra Leone the numbers killed by SALW 
is not known. More than a quarter of all households had lost a member killed during 
the conflict. It is quite conceivable that large numbers could have been killed with 
clubs, sticks, machetes and similar weapons, rather than SALW. Further, many 
atrocities were committed in Sierra Leone with implements, rather than SALW – to 
heighten suffering and intimidate, most notably through amputation – which has had 
considerable impoverishing impacts on those affected. 
 
At one level, the possession of SALW and their ability to kill large numbers of people 
rapidly – a military capacity largely denied to the CDF – could be described as giving 
the rebels an advantage and enabling them to continue the conflict over long periods 
of time with extremely small numbers of combatants and in the face of external 
intervention. With the power of the gun, the rebels were able, for example, to terrorise 
some communities and destroy their livelihoods across many districts with virtual 
impunity. However, this capacity for violence could be described to an extent as much 
attributable to the weakness of the national army and the indecisive nature of external 
military intervention until the closing stages of the conflict, as to the inherent 
advantages of being armed with SALW.   
 
Further, a decisive factor in halting and eventually defeating the RUF was the CDF, 
which mobilised large numbers of civilians and traditional hunters to fight the RUF 
but had relatively few SALW. In some parts of the country for long periods of time 
they, in effect, repelled the RUF and allowed communities to lead relatively normal 
existences. Thus, non-SALW weapons provided an extremely valuable community 
protection function which safeguarded some individuals against impoverishment. 
Further, fighting in Sierra Leone did not lead to a massive escalation in the possession 
of SALW – even though arms were transferred into Sierra Leone and numbers of 
SALW increased – nor was the mass of the population armed or society 
comprehensively militarised. The power of the gun clearly exerted considerable 
influence within communities, but there is little evidence that most civilians wished to 
or did develop a reliance on small arms or adopted a gun culture. Rather, leaving 
aside individual acts of revenge and retaliation, there developed a deep trauma and a 
desire for the horrors of the conflict to end amongst much of the civilian population. 
This contributed to a gathering revulsion and antipathy towards the RUF as the 
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conflict progressed and eroded some initial support for the RUF based on its promises 
to build a fairer more equalitarian society.  
 
Where SALW did contribute to chronic insecurity and cycles of violence was mainly 
at the local level in the absence of protection. These localised insecurities also had 
knock-on impacts on other parts of the country in terms of halting supplies, closing 
down markets, and causing mass displacements.  
 
SALW were not normally used by the rebels for conventional ‘war-fighting’ 
purposes, such as meeting opponents in pitched battle and for the holding and defence 
of clearly defined territory, but rather to create disorder and insecurity within which 
certain objectives and needs could be met. The RUF and other groups used SALW 
among other things: 
 
 to empty communities, to create confusion and disorder, and to allow them to 
seize new recruits and project (in the case of the RUF) its commitment to 
‘revolutionary’ change; 
 for group plunder purposes and for personal enrichment/survival; 
 for revenge/empowerment and so-called ‘psychological’ purposes; 
 to seize communities and utilise them for supply or strategic and tactical 
purposes. 
 for community defence and survival.  
 
Sometimes the ‘winning’ of conflict – for example the defeat of an enemy – was 
secondary or not even an immediate objective. Government forces often played a 
peripheral role and the RUF would only hold onto a few established bases and would 
disappear and re-emerge from the bush unpredictably. It was in areas in the south and 
east mainly that the CDF established strongholds that they protected.  
 
The consequences of the use of SALW to further these tactics and objectives were 
considerable in terms of insecurity.  Few communities were safe. The targeting of 
communities by RUF combatants would frequent involve surprise, or ‘hit and run’ 
raids in which adults were either shot, or tortured to death, and some villagers 
recruited for slave functions, particularly in the east for mining purposes. Children 
were forcibly recruited into the RUF, trained, and indoctrinated.  
 
At other times, particularly early in the conflict, the RUF would announce raids on 
villages persuading many villagers to flee. Traditional leaderships were routinely 
killed if they had not already fled villages. The net impact of this was to create an 
atmosphere of fear and insecurity through the entry or threatened entry of SALW-
armed RUF. Few civilians in towns such as Makeni had the capacity to defend 
themselves against SALW, the government provided little or no protection, and the 
CDFs were frequently poorly equipped or weak. Some northern-based CDF fighters 
actually joined the RUF when Makeni was taken, interviewed civilians suggested.11  
 
Many villagers were forced to flee or hide in the bush and scramble a subsistence 
living or head to urban areas to pursue a precarious living. Further, where the RUF 
                                                 
11 Interview with civil society organisations and ex-combatants in Makeni, May 2004. 
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occupied strategic towns, such as Makeni, many in the community were compelled to 
stay and assist the RUF, including providing foodstuffs. 
 
Within CDF-protected or defended areas, such as Bo Town in the south, the 
appearance of RUF and AFRC armed with SALW posed an acute security threat for 
largely unarmed civilians. The RUF imposed a siege around Bo town. However, 
civilians confronted the RUF and despite huge casualties prevented the RUF from 
taking the town. Faced with armed RUF, the social capital and solidarity of the town, 
which had a reputation for fierce resistance to government repression, held firm and 
did not fragment. In other areas where the CDF developed control, communities 
managed to live a relatively secure existence for much of the conflict. 
 
However, the impact of SALW on the urban setting of Freetown were highly divisive 
and destabilising. The entry of the RUF into Freetown in 1997, and their dispersal by 
Nigerian ECOMOG troops in 1998, for example, led to an orgy of shootings and 
reprisals against civilians. Freetown was ill-prepared for the RUF attacks. Many in 
Freetown thought of RUF incursions as a rural matter that would not directly impact 
upon Freetown. The army was unable to protect Freetown – indeed the AFRC invited 
the RUF in – and civilians were denied protection. Further, social solidarity was much 
weaker in Freetown than in many other parts of the country with large numbers of 
refugees and a social/ethnic composition that was diverse. In a few days, thousands 
were shot and the city disintegrated into extreme violence with any civilian liable to 
be reported as a collaborator to the Nigerians or to the RUF and summarily shot. 
Many civilians hid almost permanently in their houses or elsewhere and only emerged 
to gather food. Trust between neighbours was undermined by these high levels of 
insecurity. 
  
In fact, one of the more enduring impacts of SALW was not so much the numbers of 
people killed or injured by SALW, although these were high, but more social and 
psychological. The possession of SALW allowed certain individuals, including the 
poor, whom regarded themselves as wronged, disadvantaged or otherwise lacked 
power, to assert themselves against civilians through robbery, terror tactics, rape and 
killings. At the same time, the entry of RUF, army units, and at times CDF into 
communities created mass terror whose impacts are still evident today. Gunshots 
became associated with the terrorisation of communities and towns. Civilians in 
Freetown, Bo and Makeni related how the sound of gunshots, or noises that sounded 
like them, still in 2004 induced physical manifestations of stress. In 2001, British 
military officers working with the Sierra Leone army noted that army firing exercises 
required prior notification to the population on radio shows and through other means 
to avert panic and fears that fighting had broken out again.12
 
Overall, SALW contributed to creating cycles of insecurity and near anarchy in parts 
of Sierra Leone where: 
 
 traditional customs, practices, and authorities were undermined and the old 
ways no longer necessarily provided security and stability; 
 law and order, to the extent it existed, collapsed and robbery and personal 
enrichment was pervasive; 
                                                 
12 Interview with British army officers, Freetown, November 2001. 
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 any residual confidence in the state as a protector collapsed and it in fact was 
widely regarded as an abuser; 
 survival became even more dependent on the group, the extended family, or 
external intervention such as the provision of IDP camps or protection from 
external forces, who sometimes, in turn, abused the impoverished. 
 SALW became livelihood earners for those who possessed them and a means 
of survival in a hostile environment. 
 
3. The impact of SALW and armed violence on poverty   
 
This section examines what impacts the insecurities associated with SALW usage and 
possession in Sierra Leone had on development and, in particular, in terms of 
impoverishment.  
 
3.1  Economic activity 
 
There is clear evidence that armed violence led to considerable declines in economic 
activity in Sierra Leone and increased impoverishment. Declines in economic 
performance can be directly traced to periods where armed violence was at its height 
and to specific conflict incidents – such as SALW-armed RUF seizing mines in 1995. 
This denied the government an important source of income and contributed to further 
declines in its already limited capacity to deliver services to the population, including 
the poor. The insecurities faced by many civilians where gun-tooting individuals and 
groups could seize goods or rob, led to the curtailment of normal patterns of economic 
activities with many civilians choosing to hide in their homes, flee into the bush, or 
disperse to non-conflict zones. All this brought traditional economic activities, such as 
markets, to a halt.          
 
Although poverty was acute before the conflict,13 and had been worsening for several 
years by 1990, it was estimated that over 80% of the population lived below the 
poverty line of US$1 per capita per day, the conflict markedly exacerbated poverty 
levels and retarded prospects for development.14 During 1991-99, there were attempts 
to implement reform but these were held back by outburst of armed violence and the 
consequent political instability.  
 
Declines in economic activities came to a head in the mid-1990s. The escalation of 
rebel activities at the end of 1995, which spread to the mining areas, meant that 
government programmes ran into significant difficulties. RUF attacks and closures of 
bauxite and rutile mines, as well as disruptions to other economic activities, led 
economic growth to plummet in 1995. Mining and manufacturing companies closed 
down with total investment and output declining to their lowest levels during the 
height of the civil conflict in 1997-1999. Armed violence lessened with the election of 
the democratic government and a new economic recovery programme in 1996. 
                                                 
13 There were a number of variables, other than armed violence, which influenced poverty prior to the civil war. 
For example, some farmers withdrew from rice production to subsistence production because of the Stevens’ 
administration policy of importing rice. Diamond production had been reduced to a trickle shortly before the 
outbreak of the civil war because of smuggling. Further government expenditure on welfare fell dramatically in the 
1980s. Government corruption and economic mismanagement had a considerable impact on poverty in this pre-
conflict period as well as armed violence during the conflict. Insights provided by Professor Zack-Williams to the 
author. 
14 World Bank, 17 July 2001, p. 1. 
 16
Armed violence and poverty in Sierra Leone, Ginifer, March 2005 
Despite the uncertain security environment, economic performance improved 
considerably with real GDP growth rising to 5% and inflation declining to about 6% 
in 1996.15  
 
However, the coup in May 1997 and the RUF invasion of Freetown in January 1999, 
which was accompanied by massive socio-economic infrastructure destruction, led to 
real GDP plunging 20% in 1997, stagnating in 1998, and declining a further 8% in 
1999. Armed violence led to widespread destruction and hampered the government’s 
capacity to mobilise domestic resources and also considerably reduced average 
household income. 
 
In 1999, Sierra Leone was in a state of near total social, economic and physical 
destruction, according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Entire villages 
and some larger rural towns had been completely destroyed.16 70% of Sierra 
Leoneans were unemployed, of which 55% were youths, and the majority of industry 
was closed down.17 Virtually all rural banks had been destroyed.18 All this drastically 
curtailed economic activities in Sierra Leone. Many civilians in Freetown, for 
example, in 1997-1998, were unable to emerge from their homes because they risked 
being shot. Some only emerged at night to forage for food and normal patterns of 
trade, including markets, were impossible to sustain. Further, business people were 
unable to trade for long periods and shopkeepers kept their shops closed much of the 
time and consumed their own stocks in order to survive or avoid being robbed by 
neighbours or combatants. 
 
Diamond mine inaccessibility considerably reduced rural incomes and worsened 
poverty in both rural and urban communities. Many youths, in particular, had been 
dependent on mining to scratch a living. The closure of mines or their seizure by 
armed RUF closed an important economic activity which had drastic consequences in 
terms of impoverishment. Indeed, the only reliable source of an income or livelihood 
for many youths was to join an armed group. The uncertainty and risk associated with 
conflict minimized development activities by donors in Sierra Leone.  
 
Nevertheless, real GDP recovered by 3.8% in 2000 following improvements in the 
security situation and expansion in economic activities. The economy continued to 
recover with the consolidation of the peace process and the collection of SALW and 
disarmament in 2001. There was real growth of 5.4% in 2001 and the recovery of 
economic activity accelerated in 2002. Real GDP growth reached an estimated 6.6% 
in 2002 in line with a donor-financed upsurge in imports, increased agricultural 
output, increased resettlement and rehabilitation, removal of war-related constraints 
on trade and mobility, commercial growth, and stable price levels, according to the 
UN.19  
 
However, the Leone currency depreciated 30% in 2001 reversing the appreciation in 
2000. Further, during 2003-4, inflation increased dramatically (around 300% in less 
                                                 
15 World Bank, April 2003, p. 2. 
16 ILO, February 2000, p. 1. 
17 ILO, February 2000, p. 1. 
18 ILO, February 2000, p. 2. 
19 United Nations Country Team, March 2003, p. 6. 
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than two years) with certain key commodities such as petrol, palm oil and rice 
increasingly becoming outside the means of considerable sectors of the population. 
 
Poverty impacts  
 
 SALW-armed combatants were able to close down or divert production in 
mining area which led directly to economic growth plummeting in Sierra 
Leone further impoverishing much of the population. 
 Rural youths, particularly those dependent on diamond mining, were 
impoverished as a result of armed violence.   
 Falls in GDP and economic growth can be directly traced to incidents of 
armed violence. 
 
3.2  Food security and agricultural productivity 
 
Some of the most direct poverty impacts can be attributed to the destruction of 
agricultural livelihoods caused by armed violence and consequent food insecurity. 
Agriculture was, and continues to be, one of the most important sectors in Sierra 
Leone. In 2003, the World Bank noted that agriculture employed around two-thirds of 
the working population with subsistence agriculture dominating the sector.20  
 
However, agriculture was severely disrupted during the conflict with the introduction 
of SALW in places such as Bo and Makeni. In Bo Town the failure of the RUF to 
take the town led to a siege in which supplies into the town were drastically reduced 
by a cordon of SALW-armed RUF who established checkpoints through which any 
civilians seeking to forage for supplies would have to pass. Outside and encircling the 
RUF, Kamajors and ECOWAS troops operated further checkpoints. The net result of 
this was to virtually starve Bo Town and destroy its agricultural links with 
neighbouring communities. When Makeni was taken by the RUF all livestock were 
killed and agriculture virtually ground to a halt.21 In fact, by 2000 the RUF had 
virtually starved itself in Makeni and had to rely on supplies of food from INGOs. In 
both contexts, food insecurity was rife and traditional patterns of agriculture destroyed 
and those reliant upon it were impoverished. In Makeni and Freetown people starved 
as a result of the curtailed supplies of food caused by the conflict, particularly when 
family members or household heads were shot or disabled and the family network 
collapsed. Neighbours and traditional food support systems no longer functioned as 
other families could barely fend for themselves in most instances.  
 
Throughout the RUF occupation of Kambia District, agricultural production and 
livestock was disrupted.  Rural infrastructure was destroyed including stores and 
drying floors and agricultural machinery, while the unavailability of seeds, and the 
inability to cultivate land because of insecurity and massive displacement, led to a 
considerable decline in agricultural activity and therefore impacted upon food security 
in the region. Further, during the conflict markets were heavily disrupted with market 
centres totally vandalized or burnt down.22  
 
                                                 
20 World Bank, April 2003, p. 2. 
21 Interviews with community leaders in Makeni, May 2004. 
22 Kambia Humanitarian Task Force, June 2001, p. 15. 
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The conflict severely disrupted agricultural activities across Sierra Leone and led to 
the displacement of an estimated 500,000 farm families, and the loss of farm inputs, 
and the destruction of rural infrastructure, institutions and service centres. Fish 
production and livestock populations were also significantly reduced. In particular, 
rice production, a key nutritional commodity, slumped across Sierra Leone and there 
was a movement from traditional foodstuffs to less nutritious root crops and ‘bush’ 
products. Farmers were forced to flee as the conditions in many villagers were too 
insecure and precarious to tend rice and they risked being shot. If rice was produced, 
farmers were vulnerable to having their crops seized by SALW-armed combatants. 
Root crops became more prevalent because they were easier to tend, or consume on 
the run, and were less likely to be targeted by combatants during the conflict. 
Nonetheless, these were also seized by combatants after communities ran out of rice 
supplies. Those local populations that stayed were sometimes tithed to support war 
camps.23  
 
The post-conflict consequences of damaged rice production have been considerable. 
Rice is the staple food for about 99% of the population, it was reported by the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 2001.24 Rice production in 2002 was reported 
as increasing by 36% on 2001 levels and reaching 78% of pre-conflict levels. 
However, this only met 50% of the 2003 domestic requirement, according to a UN 
Transitional Appeal for Relief and Recovery Report. Sierra Leone is now heavily 
dependent on rice imports, although dependence on imported rice predated the civil 
war.25 The consequence of this is that rice in Sierra Leone costs more than in, for 
example, the UK, and is of a poorer quality, and is well beyond the means of much of 
the population. 
 
In other sectors, agriculture still has not fully recovered from armed violence - for 
example many palm and coffee plantations are still out of use after being burnt or 
suffering long-term damage from lack of tending. A series of other impacts from 
armed violence can be identified, such as: declines in agricultural infrastructure, rural 
credit facilities, markets, and the availability of farming equipment. A further impact 
was that the conflict destroyed the artisan blacksmith industry which had been the 
backbone of small farmer agricultural production.  
 
During the conflict, basic food commodities tripled in price in some urban centres, it 
was noted in 1999. And in rebel-held areas, such as Makeni, malnutrition was severe 
with a prevalence in children aged under five at a level of 25-40% in one location in 
the district in 1999.  
 
Poverty impacts: 
 
 SALW attacks on civilians in towns such as Makeni and Bo Town forced 
many to flee into the bush and survive as they could on ‘bush’ products. Many 
suffered from malnutrition or were ill and unable to work or support their 
families 
                                                 
23 Richards, August 2003, p. 28. 
24 UNDP, 29 April 2002, p. 61. 
25 Observation by Professor Zack-Williams to the author. 
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 Farmers lost their livelihoods as they were too fearful of armed combatants to 
farm. Further, they were robbed and their agricultural assets sometimes 
destroyed.  
 Patterns of agriculture were changed by armed violence. Rice farmers risked 
being shot and output slumped. Limited farming of root crops – such as 
cassava – took its place, but this was less nutritious. Following the conflict, 
rice production still has not fully recovered. 
 
However, agricultural production did continue in some towns where the RUF 
considered it expedient to allow it (supplies were seized or passed onto the RUF) and 
in some CDF-held areas where agriculture was maintained to both feed fighters and 
civilians. 
 
3.3  Infrastructure destruction and trade  
 
The appearance of SALW-armed RUF in towns and villages frequently overwhelmed 
local CDF, particularly in the absence of support from the army or ECOMOG or UN 
forces. The process of fear and intimidation meant that the RUF was free to destroy 
and rob government and other buildings and houses on which many civilians 
depended. The RUF frequently targeted houses for burning and robbing and 
government buildings were routinely destroyed as part of a process of undermining 
the government. Much of Sierra Leone was devastated by the conflict with over 3,000 
villages and towns damaged by widespread destruction of homes, health care and 
basic facilities and infrastructure.26  
 
Kambia District, which the RUF relinquished control over in May 2001, saw the 
majority of public buildings and much private housing destroyed by the RUF and 
cross border bombardment by Guinean forces. It has been estimated to have suffered 
80-90% housing destruction during the conflict.27 Further, the RUF had made bridges 
and minor roads impassable to traffic. It was estimated after the conflict that 60% of 
all intact houses in 2003 had been damaged during the conflict and of those 58% were 
significantly or severely damaged. Nearly three-quarters of Kenema sample houses 
had been damaged, while in Tonkolili it was 72%, and 69% in Bo and Kono 
districts.28  
 
SALW were used to disrupt supplies and transportation. The RUF, in particular, 
ambushed government lorries and supplies sent to besieged areas through SALW 
attacks. They also co-opted lorry drivers they did not kill to deliver their own 
supplies. The army and the CDF also hijacked suspected RUF supplies and robbed 
lorry drivers. Another tactic used by SALW-armed RUF was to surround key towns, 
such as Bo, and enforce a siege where supplies into Bo from surroundings villages, 
vital to its survival, were squeezed, and normal patterns of trade became impossible.  
The RUF attempted to disrupt supplies to a number of provincial towns and were 
close enough to Freetown and main roads to Makeni, for example, to seriously disrupt 
supplies. Supplies, in fact, ran short in a number of provincial towns.29  
  
                                                 
26 United Nations Country Team, March 2003, p. 1. 
27 Fanthorpe, February 2003, p. 13. 
28 Kenefick and Conte, June 2003, p. 32. 
29 Clapham, July 2003, p. 13. 
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Local and regional trading patterns were altered with some markets no longer being 
sustainable post-conflict and towns and communities close to Sierra Leone’s borders 
choosing to switch trade to neighbouring countries. Post-conflict recovery has been 
slow with deliveries of goods down on the pre-conflict period. Further, many lorry 
drivers were killed and the remaining ones are largely impoverished. In Makeni, for 
example, few lorry drivers have jobs and have to rely on loading and unloading lorries 
from other districts.30 Whereas previously they might have owned a lorry or being 
able to sustainability rent it; they were no longer able to purchase a lorry or afford the 
rents. Towns that had big markets and were centres for regional trade, such as 
Makeni, have not fully recovered and assumed their former importance. Despite road 
construction and repair, some roads are still in bad repair and cut-off during the June-
July rainy season, truck drivers reported. Feeder roads, which provided outlets for 
farmers to sell their products in market centres, were either dug up or the bridges 
destroyed by rebels and have not been fully renewed. The Ministry of Transport and 
Communication estimated that around 75% of privately operated vehicles were 
destroyed or burnt during May 1997 and the instability that followed.  
 
Poverty impacts: 
 
 The majority of householders had their houses destroyed or they were evicted 
at gunpoint in conflict zones in Sierra Leone. At the same time, they often lost 
their possessions and were robbed. This in itself impoverished them and often 
destroyed their livelihoods displacing them into IDP or refugee camps or 
making them dependent on subsistence strategies. 
 SALW-armed rebels cut off the supplies to many towns and villages by 
shooting or intimidating lorry drivers seeking to keep roads open and feed 
starving civilians. The RUF also laid siege to key towns. Many people in 
besieged towns were impoverished or even starved and communities have yet 
to fully recover. Many lorry drivers were, and continue to be, impoverished 
and are without work. 
 Armed violence has changed patterns of trade and transportation. Roads have 
yet to fully recover, despite foreign investment, and fewer lorries are 
transporting goods than before the conflict. The violence changed trading 
patterns in that communities and markets that formerly had trading links could 
no longer do so because of the dangers of armed violence. Thus, some 
communities adjacent to borders shifted trade to neighbouring countries or 
transported goods by sea rather than over land. For some traders this has 
brought financial benefits as they get better prices: for example for palm oil in 
Guinea. However, others are poorer.  
 
3.4 Social and cultural impacts 
 
The possession and use of SALW, particularly by youths and groups that had been 
traditionally disadvantaged or impoverished, has had lasting impacts upon societal 
relations in Sierra Leone. Individuals who had little or no power in communities were 
able with the power of a gun in their hands to enrich themselves, take revenge against 
those they regarded as having exploited them, and to assume, albeit temporarily in 
many instances, positions in a new hierarchy. Further, those who fled armed violence, 
                                                 
30 Interviews with lorry drivers in Makeni, May 2004. 
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in some instances emerged with a new determination to oppose traditional hierarchies 
or gained new insights into human rights issues. Experiences during the civil conflict 
of abuses of power have generated ‘acute rights awareness’ among sectors of the 
population.31  
 
A key impact of armed violence was the undermining of patrimony. Traditional 
leaders in much of the country proved unable to protect their communities from 
armed violence and fled. The CDF, as well as the RUF, initiated significant changes 
in the countryside. They developed considerable independence of the hierarchy of 
traditional rural chiefs during the conflict. The CDF assumed increasing importance 
as a source of authority. Civilians supported CDF fighters with food and other 
resources and the CDF assumed considerable authority with disputes, for example, 
not being settled by local courts presided over by chiefs, but the guild of kamajoisia. 
Like the RUF, many in the CDF were determined to secure a better deal and justice 
for the young, who had suffered under corrupt chiefs and the justice system. Indeed, 
the CDF were known to have threatened chiefs with violence in some instances.32 
Deferential attitudes to village hierarchies post-conflict are being challenged by 
younger people and villagers post-conflict, who abandoned by their chiefs, are no 
longer prepared to stay quiet. Strangers, women and youths are said to be prepared to 
speak out in meetings, and openly complain against grievances, including the misuse 
of humanitarian/development aid that did not find its way to the less powerful. People 
are said to talk openly about their ‘eyes now being open’ and that during the conflict 
when they were hiding in the bush from SALW-armed RUF they had no alternative 
by to ‘stand by themselves’.33 However, deference to authority and an unwillingness 
to speak out against the powerful can still be detected in large sectors of the 
population. 
 
At the same time, the growth of ‘individualism’ and looting has made the parallel 
market an endemic aspect of social life.34 All groups, and many individuals, involved 
in the fighting used the power of the gun to extract resources, to enrich themselves, 
and to fund the conflict.35 And some observers have suggested that Sierra Leone has 
become a less communal society in the post-conflict period.  
 
For many, the fractures in societal relations engendered by the use of SALW and 
armed violence has had negative impacts. In Freetown, for example, over 7,000 
people were killed in January 1999 alone representing the killing of 0.7% of Freetown 
residents over a three-week period.36 Thousands suffered shootings. A survey by 
Médecins Sans Frontières of a major general hospital in Freetown in February 1999 
found 215 war-related injuries (57% gunshot wounds, 30% cutlass injuries and 6% 
shelling injuries).37 Neighbours were unable to trust each other and lived in fear of 
being shot or killed by the RUF or by ECOMOG troops seeking out informers, and 
many householders, particularly the better off, had their houses looted by neighbours 
with whom they had previously enjoyed good relations. Being reported by a 
                                                 
31 Fanthorpe, February 2003, p. 13. 
32 Richards, August 2003, p. 31. 
33 Richards, 2001, p. 3. 
34 Richards, August 2003, p. 37. 
35 United Methodist Committee on Relief, 19 April 2000, p. 1. 
36 Salama et al, 11 December 1999, p. 1569. 
37 Salama et al, 11 December 1999, p. 1569. 
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neighbour as a ‘spy’ or sympathetic to a rival group was enough for many to be 
summarily shot. The fallout from this has been a long-term erosion of trust and 
reciprocity in many parts of Freetown, interviewees reported. 
 
An under-estimated impact of SALW and the violence committed with them is the 
continuing trauma experienced by perhaps the majority of Sierra Leoneans. Virtually 
all have lost members of their immediate or extended family either killed by SALW 
or by other weapons, or seriously injured. Many are still in a state of barely surpassed 
shock or trauma, which could be readily re-activated by armed violence. Civilians 
interviewed in Freetown, for example, recounted how any sound that resembles gun-
fire (such as a car miss-firing) can send them into a state of trauma.38 The impact of 
this trauma is difficult to quantify but some interviewees speculate that it had led to a 
sense of apathy, listlessness, and a lack of energy in some quarters to tackle Sierra 
Leone’s post-conflict problems. An INGO worker who has spend many years in 
Sierra Leone noted that many of the people he worked with lacked the confidence to 
make decisions or to change things − attitudes that seem to be related to the trauma of 
the conflict.39
 
However, although the thought of a return to conflict fills many Sierra Leoneans with 
horror, the behaviour of the government during the conflict, and its continuing 
corruption, could readily spark demonstrations and renewed large-scale violence. In 
March 2005, thousands of students, clashed with police who opened fire with assault 
rifles, it is alleged, and injured at least three protestors.40 The protest started over 
lecturer strikes over non-payment of salaries. The outrage in civil society over the 
shootings and the police being allegedly armed with AK-47s has been manifest and 
had the potential to lead to massive demonstrations and violence if the government 
mishandled the situation.41 Earlier in the year in January, the unions flexed their 
muscles with a one day strike that paralysed the country and shut down Lungi airport. 
Ex-CDF fighters and others elements, such as so-called ‘area boys’, as well as civil 
society, have the capacity to readily react to any government actions that are seen as 
repressive.  
 
Poverty impacts  
 
 The revolt against traditional authority during the conflict and the temporary 
empowerment of some youths through SALW possession and usage has not 
led to any significant economic dividend for the young. They remain 
impoverished, and youth combatants amongst the most so. Although 
traditional leaders are in some instances comparatively less well off as a result 
of the conflict, they still retain much of their power and authority in the 
countryside. Social capital in many villages remains damaged by an uneasy 
stand-off between tradition and new ideas that have emerged following armed 
violence, particularly amongst those who fled to refugee and IDP camps where 
they picked up new conceptions of human rights. This may be hampering 
recovery. 
                                                 
38 Interviews conducted in Freetown in May 2004. 
39 Interview conducted with INGO in Freetown, May 2004. 
40 Reported in Freetown press, March 2005. 
41 Information provided by Christiana Solomon from Freetown, March 2005. 
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 Violence committed with SALW and other weapons within both urban and 
rural settings seriously undermined trust, norms, reciprocity and networks. 
This had a carry-over impact post-conflict in that it damaged networks and 
social transactions that traditionally provided some sort of safety net for the 
impoverished, or those who were in danger of becoming impoverished. 
 
3.5  Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups 
 
Vulnerable groups were exploited and impoverished as a result of SALW violence. 
There has been little post-conflict improvement in their situation.  
 
Many women were co-opted by the rebels, the army and CDF fighters (4,751 women 
passed through the DDR programme) as commander’s wives, prostitutes, slaves, 
spies, but some were also involved in the planning and execution of violence. Rape 
and sexual violence was rampant. Women generally suffered extremely high levels of 
violence. The level of prostitution has risen sharply post-conflict, while the age of the 
‘Kolonkos’, as young prostitutes (some school girls) are nicknamed, has been falling 
to alarmingly low levels.42 In a survey of war-related sexual violence and other human 
rights abuses against IDPs in Sierra Leone, 13% of household members reported 
incidents of war-related abductions, beatings, killings, sexual assaults and other 
abuses. 9% reported war-related sexual assaults.43  
 
Sexual networks were altered through the displacement of populations, psychological 
trauma and the progressive impoverishment of women. Sexual contact with 
internationals and combatants has led to rapid increases in HIV infection. Social 
problems, such as crime, teenage pregnancy, juvenile delinquency, rose, as did the 
incidence of war-related trauma. The rebel invasion of the capital in January 1999 led 
to large numbers of young girls, women and children being raped and kidnapped.  
 
Boys were forced into prostitution both in Sierra Leone (mainly in response to 
demand from internationals) and in neighbouring countries such as Guinea in order to 
support their families, or for survival purposes if they became destitute. Prior to the 
conflict, male prostitution was virtually unknown and carried considerable stigma 
because of its associations with homosexuality, which was, and still is, strongly 
disapproved of in Sierra Leone.  
 
Child soldiers were co-opted by all sides (6,787 passed through DDR) and were 
particularly badly treated by the RUF. The RUF sometimes gave children and youths 
a mixture of cocaine, gun powder and alcohol to increase their aggression. An 
estimated 36,600 children were said to have been affected by the conflict in 2001 
including child soldiers, camp followers, street children and war-affected children in 
IDP camps.44  
 
The young – whether combatants or not – suffered impoverishing impacts during and 
after the conflict. In the 1980s, the national economy started to decline, corruption 
prevailed, prices of raw materials dropped considerably, mining revenues fell, and 
increasing numbers of youths in this climate found themselves out of school, without 
                                                 
42 Bright, June 2001, p. 3. 
43 Amowitz, 23 January 2002, p. 1. 
44 UNDP, 29 April 2002, p. 67. 
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employment and without support. The conflict made their economic prospects even 
worse with schools destroyed, farms plundered for cash-crops and food, and trade and 
business activities curtailed due to dangers of attack and ambushes.  
 
Rural youth, particularly in the east, many of whom who had moved there attracted by 
diamond mining, lived in a violent and uncertain world.45 With schools, 
apprenticeships, training institutes and normal educational opportunities closed down, 
young people turned to other opportunities, including joining a militia. Many youths 
took up arms as a survival strategy. Holding weapons gave them an ‘advantage over 
unarmed civilians who have food or other items’.46  
 
The future prospects of Sierra Leone will depend in large part on the economic 
opportunities open to youths and measures to address their social inclusion, especially 
as they constitute 2.5m of the population, and include a small but vocal number of ex-
combatants.47  
 
Poverty impacts  
 
 Women have been particularly impoverished by armed violence in Sierra 
Leone. Women were highly disadvantaged before the conflict, with rape and 
domestic violence common, and they had few rights (they were not permitted 
to buy property for example). Once raped, women had a highly possibility of 
losing their husbands and hence their capacity to support themselves, as many 
were dependent on them financially. Further, the health impacts of rape, with 
social services destroyed, often incapacitated them and prevented them from 
working. Following the conflict, women without husbands have found it 
extremely difficult to re-marry as few men are in a position to support a new 
family that any new wife is likely to bring. However, an unintended 
consequence of armed violence has been that some women have been alerted 
to the inequities of the past and are challenging some of the chauvinistic 
norms that underpinned injustice and violence against women. This may assist 
in the future in opening up new employment opportunities for women. 
 Other groups, such as the disabled, were left to fend for themselves during the 
conflict and died or fell sick. The desperate conditions of the conflict led to 
many being abandoned and sinking further into poverty. They have also been 
hampered by perceptions in society that being disabled is a consequence of 
past ‘sins’. 
 Youths sometimes managed to enrich themselves during the conflict through 
armed robbery and pillaging. However, this has not been sustained following 
the ending of the conflict when many are viewed with suspicion by 
communities, or even their own families, and sustainable employment is 
elusive. If anything, they are poorer than before the conflict, despite GoSL and 
international programmes that seek to build livelihoods and create alternatives 
to violence for the young.  
 
                                                 
45 Clapham, C., July 2003, p. 13. 
46 Peters, K., April 2004, p. 2. 
47 UNAMSIL, August 2003, p. 7. 
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3.6  Political economy factors 
 
The exploitation of civilians by combatants had negative impacts in terms of 
impoverishment.  Captives were taken by the RUF for slave labour purposes and these 
were mainly illiterate adults. Often, they were worked to death. In Tane Chiefdom, 
SALW-armed RUF extracted food from civilians and mobilized forced labour for 
gold mining activities. Control of the diamond fields became a key strategic objective 
of the conflict. Areas under RUF control were normally stripped of items of value, 
such as housing materials, timber and motorized vehicles. If these were not put to 
RUF use, they were trafficked over the border or sold or bartered. The acquisition of 
loot has been described as one of the key driving forces for the acquisition of territory 
by the RUF.48 All the parties depended on diamonds as a major direct or indirect part 
of their revenue including mercenary forces, the RUF and its Liberian backers, 
government forces, local militias, and individuals in ECOMOG and UNAMSIL 
forces.49  
 
Poverty impacts  
 
 Rebels armed with SALW closed down mining areas and industry which 
impoverished many people, particularly those in rural areas. Where the RUF 
continued mining, people were coerced into working there at gunpoint for 
little or no wages further impoverishing them and their families. Further, the 
closure of mining and key industries denied the government revenues which 
meant they spent even less on social and other government services. 
 Combatants enriched themselves through the power of the gun through the 
seizure of government and private company assets and also by robbing 
civilians of their assets. This was not limited to the rebels. 
 
3.7  Social Services 
 
Social services were virtually closed down during the conflict which had drastic 
impacts upon health and education and knock-on effects on livelihoods. There has 
been post-conflict rebuilding of social services, but shortages of supplies, poor 
infrastructure, and difficulties in paying staff, are hampering recovery. Many of the 
weak, aged, or young died of treatable ailments during the conflict due to a lack of 
medical attention. UNICEF observed as late as 2001 that the protracted conflict was 
having a dramatic impact on health.50 Population movements, overcrowding, and poor 
sanitary living conditions had exacerbated already high mortality, and infectious 
diseases such as malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. Routine childhood 
immunisation had almost completely collapsed in some areas of Sierra Leone and 
infant and under-five mortality rates were among the highest in the world. In late 
2000, only 26% of Peripheral Health Units (PHUs) were found to be functional. 
National Recovery data in June 2003 showed that 224 PHUs out of 624 had been 
rehabilitated and there were functional referral hospitals in all bar two districts. 
However, considerable problems remain particularly in areas that have large numbers 
of returnees and poor accessibility.  
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50 See: UNICEF (undated), p.1. 
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During the conflict, Sierra Leone is estimated to have lost more than 50% of health 
facilities with armed-rebels deliberately targeting and destroying health facilities and 
displacing staff as part of a strategy to create chaos and undermine the state. Further, 
the destruction of infrastructure across all sectors affected health centre operations, 
and was still doing so in 2002, because transport, communications, electricity, and 
water supply were all severely affected.51 Many NGOs who delivered health care 
during the conflict in rural areas suffered severe damage during the conflict. Of 47 
mission facilities in operation before the 1997 coup, only 20 were reported to be 
functioning in January 2003.52  
 
A lack of health resources was exacerbated by staff attrition, inadequate on-job 
training, the emigration of medical doctors, distortions in the geographic distribution 
of health workers, many of whom left unsafe areas and came to work in Freetown, 
and the lack of skills and motivation of the remaining health workers.53 The conflict 
further devastated the water supply infrastructure, which was already inadequate in 
terms of meeting the needs of the population prior to the conflict. In 2000, it was 
estimated that only between 22-35% of the population had access to portable water.54  
 
Education opportunities were lost due to armed violence. Many youths in taking up 
arms lost out on as much as 11 years of formal education. In addition, informal skills 
passed down from fathers to sons (as in agriculture) were foregone, and have not been 
recovered in many instances, and schools were destroyed or closed. All this has 
contributed to high youth unemployment rates and their post-conflict impoverishment. 
Teachers have also been impoverished by armed violence. Post-conflict education has 
yet to recover and many teachers have to take out other livelihoods to survive with 
some even trading with pupils to make a living.55 Further, many families in 
communities such as Bo are unable to afford to send their children to school. 
 
Poverty impacts:  
 
 The shooting and intimidation of teachers, health workers and others engaged 
in the social services, principally by the RUF, had drastic impoverishing 
impacts. Many were often reduced to the same level as the long-term poor. 
Further, they were unable to help other civilians with infrastructure destroyed 
and the curtailment of drugs and medical supplies.  
 Education was particularly affected as many youths missed the key years of 
their education during the 11-year conflict. And many have been unable to 
find employment, in part due to their lack of qualifications or education. Those 
that have returned to school post-conflict are often listless and disinterested.  
 Disease – much of it normally treatable – accelerated with the deepening of 
armed violence with no real provision of drugs or safe water. Population 
movements, over-crowding, and poor sanitary conditions, stimulated by 
insecurity and violence, further exacerbated disease outbreaks. The poor 
health of many Sierra Leoneans, which may have been treatable prior to armed 
violence, is pushing many further into poverty. 
                                                 
51 World Bank, 22 January 2003, p. 5. 
52 World Bank, 22 January 2003, p. 5. 
53 World Bank, 22 January 2003, p. 6. 
54 UNDP, 29 April 2002, p. 10. 
55 Interviews with teachers in Makeni, May 2004. 
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3.8  Population movements 
 
SALW violence in the countryside led to urban migration, and often impoverishment, 
and also a reluctance post-conflict to return to rural areas. During the conflict, over 
50% of Sierra Leone’s population became long-term displaced and thousands died. 
All this has led to significant impacts on the sustainability of rural communities some 
of which have been abandoned. One impact of SALW violence, it was reported 
during field work research in Makeni, was that many villagers were now unwilling to 
stay in small communities as they offered little protection against any future violence 
that may break out in Sierra Leone.  
 
SALW possession and usage and armed violence, then, profoundly modified 
settlement patterns within Sierra Leone and changed the geographical distribution of 
the population. In towns such as Freetown, infrastructure and local services were 
unable to cope with this massive inflow of people. To an extent, kinship solidarity (if 
IDPs had family connections in Freetown), provided accommodation, assistance and 
protection, but this was not sustainable in the long-term, and migration put a severe 
strain on already impoverished family networks. New squatter settlements rapidly 
grew in the outskirts of Freetown to absorb the mass of rural inhabitants anticipating 
making a ‘faster’ and easier living in the capital, but most of them become 
marginalized and slipped into urban poverty.56   
 
The east seemed to suffer most in terms of displacement. More than half the 
households in Kailahun were formal refugees, while more than half in Kenema were 
IDPs. A third of households in a Kono sample were informal refugees in that families 
had crossed the border and lived for a period of time outside Sierra Leone.  However, 
in contrast, the southern region had the least number of displaced households. Few 
households had been formal refugees – in Bo District, for example, only about 20%.57  
 
Poverty impacts:  
 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests few refugees or IDPs fleeing armed violence 
have managed to improve their economic position following the conflict. 
Indeed, it seems they have generally become more impoverished having in 
many instances to resort to petty trading, begging, or subsistence living. For 
most, the move from the countryside to urban areas has had an impoverishing 
affect. Their absence has also impacted upon rural communities denying them 
skills and expertise in sectors such as agriculture and adding to 
impoverishment. There may be some beneficiaries from skills-training and 
other forms of assistance offered in refugee and IDP camps, but in the poor 
economic climate pertaining in Sierra Leone there is little scope for these 
being exercised. Civilians who fled Sierra Leone for neighbouring countries as 
refugees have frequently been abused and have found it hard to find viable 
livelihoods on returning. 
 
                                                 
56 SWAC Secretariat, December 2003, p. 7. 
57 Kenefick and Conte, June 2003, p. 31. 
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3.9  Armed criminality 
 
Armed criminality was rife during the conflict with all combatants using the power of 
the gun to rob individuals, groups, and plunder the state. The only real protection 
offered in terms of preserving property or livelihoods in much of the country was 
possession of guns or being part of a group that was armed. Many individuals lost 
their homes and possessions through armed robbery and were impoverished – a state 
that many have yet to recover from, and indeed may be unable to do so. However, 
post-conflict armed robbery is comparatively low, although it is known that in 
Freetown from time-to-time armed robbers attack houses to steal electronic goods and 
valuables. However, according to an interviewee in the RSLAF, who had been on a 
number of sweeps with the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), he was unaware of any fatality 
through armed robbery in the capital – they were mainly used to frighten 
householders into compliance, rather than kill.58
 
Reliable data on SALW shootings is not available. However, the Commonwealth 
Community Safety and Security Programme (CCSSP) had not noted a discernable 
increase in armed criminality in Freetown, for example.59 There were reports of armed 
robbery in Bo, but interviewees were divided over whether armed violence had risen 
in comparison to pre-conflict levels. There was anecdotal evidence that drugs offences 
and property crimes were rising.60  
 
The availability, or potential availability, of small arms remains a matter of concern. 
Illicit weapons seized during the conflict remain unaccounted for. Although special 
attention was given to the recovery of weapons formerly seized by combatants from 
UNAMSIL and ECOMOG during the conflict, and also those provided by the UK 
government to the GoSL, it is believed that many of these latter high-quality weapons 
were in 2003 still hidden in Sierra Leone or had crossed into neighbouring countries.61 
The whereabouts of weapons seized from the hostage-taking of UNAMSIL personnel 
remains speculative.62 Further, the number of small arms in West Africa is estimated 
to be between 7-8m: a potential resource for armed robbery and violence.63  
 
However, one positive impact of the conflict has been that SALW violence during the 
conflict in Sierra Leone has led to a general aversion to SALW display and possession 
rather than a ‘macho’ gun culture post-conflict as in many other countries. Guns are 
not openly on display or in widespread use (although it was reported during field 
research that guns could be bought in markets down country). Further, there were 
reports in areas where arms for development (AfD) programmes had been instituted, 
that people were experiencing psychological relief from the trauma of gun usage 
incurred during the conflict. People can now sleep at night and feel more confident it 
was reported in Ribbi and Kholifa Rowalla. The absence of SALW has further 
allowed people to move freely at night, to go to school, and lorries and other vehicles 
move freely now, it is said.64  
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59 Interview with Ian MacDonald, CSSP, Freetown, May 2004. 
60 Interviews with law and order officials and civilians in Freetown and Bo, May-June 2004. 
61 Eisele, 2003, p. 2. 
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64 Lochead and Greene, March/April 2004, p. 16. 
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3.9.1 Current availability 
 
Although it is widely suspected arms caches exist in Sierra Leone their location is 
uncertain. Many SALW, unless stored properly, will have severely deteriorated over 
the past two years since the ending of the civil conflict.  
 
Cross-border movements of SALW are highly likely due to poor border security and 
controls, but the extent of the problem is unknown due to a lack of reliable data. 
Movement of SALW is more likely to be out of Sierra Leone than in as demand for 
weapons in Liberia and other West African counties is higher than in Sierra Leone. 
The fact that weapons can be traded in as part of DDR programmes in Liberia (for 
US$300) and Cote d’Ivoire has led to an exiting of some weapons and ex-combatants 
from Sierra Leone.  
 
Further, there appears to be some regional variations in SALW possession and 
availability across Sierra Leone and the potential for armed violence. There is demand 
for hunting weapons, for example, in some areas although AfD programmes have 
sought to facilitate the handing of these in. The delayed return of such weapons 
following licensing arrangements has caused some tensions.   
 
And in districts bordering Guinea and Liberia in the east, continuing fears of cross-
border instabilities and the UNAMSIL draw-down, combined with doubts regarding 
the capability of the RSLAF and SLP to maintain security, have the potential to fuel 
demand for SALW.  
 
Ex-RUF are thought to have hidden weapons and may seek to retrieve them, or secure 
weapons from neighbouring countries, if insecurity grows and ex-CDF may do 
likewise. Port Loko and the West seems more stable than the east and most weapons 
seem to have been collected. 
 
Poverty impacts:  
 
 Armed robbery and violence were high during the conflict as many 
combatants lived off the land and were not restrained by their commanders 
from stealing or abusing civilians. Further, a goal of fighting was to plunder 
and all parties used robbery to sustain their capacity to fight, which 
impoverished civilians.  
 The use and possession of SALW during the conflict has perhaps surprisingly 
not led to surges in post-conflict armed violence, unlike many other conflicts, 
and despite rising poverty. Key factors explaining this may include a reaction 
and revulsion to armed violence in Sierra Leone and the open display of 
weapons, and also the presence of international military forces and a 
strengthened police force. There is no evidence that civilians are being 
significantly additionally or newly impoverished by armed violence and 
robbery in the post-conflict period. What does appear to be negative is a 
creeping concern about security in some districts where drugs and anti-social 
behaviour are increasing. And the possibilities of outbreaks of armed robbery 
and violence by impoverished individuals cannot be ruled out in the future. 
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4.  Implications for aid programming 
 
Sierra Leone has been the recipient of considerable post-conflict programming. First, 
developmental programming has sought to address some of the root causes and 
problems that have been identified as contributing to various groups taking up SALW 
and armed violence. This has included, for example, programming seeking to improve 
the position of youths in society, and also programming addressing governance issues. 
It has further embraced post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) programmes that seek to 
transform the security sector and, in particular, the army, which committed armed 
violence against civilians and failed at certain points to protect civilians from armed 
violence. The UK, for example, the major donor in Sierra Leone, in addition to SSR 
has supported media development, law development, the Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ACC), the Sierra Leone Infrastructure Reconstruction Programme 
(SLIRP), the Chiefdom Governance Reform programme, civil society capacity 
strengthening through support to organisations such as the Campaign for Good 
Governance (CGG), support for salaries in key social and security services, technical 
support to elections, the Governance Reform Secretariat Project, and humanitarian 
assistance. Support in macro-economics, food security, governance, refugee 
resettlement and the training and education of ex-combatants has been provided by 
other donors, such as the European Union (EU), and a multitude of INGO/NGOs. 
Other donors, such as the USA, Japan, China and Germany, have also instituted 
developmental programming. 
 
The second cluster of programming revolves around DDR and SALW programming – 
some of which was instituted during, as well as after, the conflict – and which have 
sought to deal with weapons possession and remove SALW from society as well as 
reintegrating ex-combatants.  
 
4.1 DDR and SALW programming 
 
There were three phases of ‘formal’ DDR between 1998 and 2002. These phases 
suffered severe setbacks at many stages, including resumptions of armed violence, 
and it was not until the closing stages of DDR in 2001 that SALW possession and 
armed violence was finally reined in. During much of the DDR process communities 
continued to suffer from high levels of insecurity with continuing impacts upon 
poverty.   
 
Phase I was initiated with the return of President Kabbah to Freetown in February 
1998 and attempted to frame a peace agreement that included DDR. DDR lasted 
between September and December 1998. It applied to all persons in any of the armed 
groups that participated in the conflict following the May 1997 coup. It targeted about 
75,000 combatants including 55,000 CDF, 10,000 ex-SLA and AFRC, 7,000 RUF, 
3,000 child combatants and 300 disabled.65 After the establishment of the government 
DDR body, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (NCDDR), the programme was further reviewed in July 1998, and 
targeted a considerably smaller number of ex-combatants – about 45,000.  
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However, only about 3,200 combatants were disarmed and these were mainly ex-
SLA/AFRC who surrendered to ECOMOG. With the conflict escalating and RUF 
attacks on Freetown in January 1999, DDR become increasingly difficult. 
 
DDR Phase II was part of the Lomé Peace agreement signed on 7 July 1999. It made 
provision for the disarmament of all combatants and paramilitary groups. UNAMSIL 
succeeded ECOMOG with a mandate to disarm combatants.66 Following a review and 
redesign of the DDR programme, as part of a multi-donor initiative, five 
demobilisation components were set up and reinsertion packages were initiated 
including a transitional safety allowance (TSA) of about US$300 in two payments for 
combatants. A total of 18,898 persons were disarmed, but once again DDR was 
interrupted by the resumption of fighting in May 2000 and the re-arming of many ex-
combatants and the suspension of the TSA.67 Subsequently, in an interim phase, some 
limited disarmament took place of 2,600 combatants, but it was not until 2001 that 
more comprehensive DDR took place. 
 
Phase III lasted from 18 May 2001 until 6 January 2002. Agreement was reached on 2 
May 2001 between the RUF and the GoSL to resume disarmament and a ceasefire 
was signed in Abuja. Almost 75,000 people registered as ex-combatants at DDR 
camps from 1998 onwards, and 60% were processed between May 2001 and January 
2002, when the conflict was officially declared over.  
 
However, there were clear gaps in DDR programming in terms of the 
comprehensiveness of weapons collection, the effective targeting and reintegration of 
ex-combatants into communities, and concerns regarding the sustainability of 
community development. New follow-up programming was initiated to address these 
gaps, for example: 
 
 DFID assisted the NCDDR with the Community Reintegration Programme 
(CRP);  
 UNDP/UNAMSIL with the Human Security Fund and Stopgaps;  
 GTZ and USAID with support to the Reintegration Opportunities Programme 
(ROP).  
 
The Stopgap Programme, which commenced in October 2001, in particular attempted 
to address time lags that ex-combatants were experiencing in receiving their 
reintegration benefits, especially in the east bordering Liberia. These delays led to 
volatility among concentrations of ex-combatants. Stopgap Programmes provided 
short-term labour intensive engagement working with the rehabilitation of vital 
community infrastructure. By June 2003, 69 Stopgap projects had been approved with 
a total commitment of US$844,000.68  
 
The social impact of Stopgaps was described as considerable with ex-combatants 
working side-by-side with community members, rehabilitating community 
infrastructure and agricultural land, which they had often destroyed or pillaged 
themselves. Civilians and community members were said to have benefited from a 
rekindling of community camaraderie and a softening of mindsets opening 
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possibilities for healing and reconciliation. Further, the programme helped rehabilitate 
infrastructure including health centres, schools, water systems, and garbage 
collection. Following the official closure of the DDR programme run by NCDDR and 
the SLP in January 2002, the Community Arms Collection and Destruction (CACD) 
Programme was set up to address shortfalls and shortcomings in the process.69 While 
the DDR process had collected around 70,000 arms it left undetermined numbers of 
ex-combatants unregistered and without benefits.  
 
Further, CDF fighters who armed themselves (in other words, were not officially 
armed by the CDF) were excluded from the process, causing considerable 
resentments. And weapons uncollected in Sierra Leone were being used for armed 
violence, especially armed robbery.70 In response to this, the CACD programme was 
initiated in mid-2002 and collected more than 9,000 weapons. Ex-combatants choose 
the community they wanted to return to and were eligible for the ROP which was 
anticipated as giving them vocational skills training, a formal education, and 
entrepreneurial support in the areas of fisheries and agriculture over a six-month 
period with a limited allowance and toolkit. However, there were considerable delays 
which triggered the UNAMSIL Stopgap Programme referred to above. 
 
CACD II had a voluntary disarmament community approach. It did not give direct 
incentives for arms to avoid problems of fraudulent weapons and the development of 
weapons as monetary assets.71 The programme aimed to promote a mindset in which 
people abandoned weapons ownership for a ‘weapons-free-environment’. As an 
incentive to ex-combatants and communities, chiefdoms were allocated US$20,000 
for development projects once they were weapons-free. Key elements of the 
programme included:  
 
 Sensitisation of chiefdom communities and social mobilization against 
SALW; 
 SALW drop-off areas for people who wanted to hand-in residual weapons in 
the community; 
 House-to–house searches by the SLP to confirm whether a chiefdom was 
weapons-free; 
 A participatory approach which permitted the whole community to determine 
and prioritise developmental needs.72   
 
In tandem with the above programmes, other initiatives such as GTZ’s ReAct 
(Rehabilitation, Reconciliation and Reintegration Activities) Programme and the CRP 
were undertaken.  
 
4.2  Constraints in programming 
 
Fault-lines are apparent in some of this programming. First, weapons collection 
during the conflict broke down and the various parties charged with implementing it 
were unable to develop a secure environment within which combatants could be 
disarmed or weapons handed in. It was only at the tail end of 2001 that disarmament 
                                                 
69 See: UNDP (undated), ‘Sierra Leone: Community Arms Collection and Development Programme’.  
70 Lochhead and Greene, March/April 2004, p. 9. 
71 Lochhead and Greene, March/April 2004, p. 9. 
72 Lochhead and Greene, March/April 2004, pp. 10-11. 
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became more comprehensive. Large numbers of weapons were hidden or exited Sierra 
Leone. An interviewee within the security services estimated that virtually all ex-
combatants either had weapons hidden (mainly in their homes) or could readily access 
them through caches or from neighbouring countries where they are freely available. 
The potential consequence of this is that if poverty continues to deepen, the 
government remains corrupt, and dissatisfaction breaks out among ex-combatants, a 
re-run of armed violence would be a distinct possibility. 
 
Second, programming has yet to fully grapple with the problem of SALW from a 
regional perspective. Arms embargoes were ineffective and were circumvented by 
adjoining countries to Sierra Leone on a regular basis.73 The RSLAF and the SLP are 
meant to have a role in policing Sierra Leone’s borders, but do not have the capacity 
to do so effectively, despite SSR which has had some impact on transforming them 
into more capable and professional forces.  It is suspected that there is bribery at 
border customs areas and many border crossings are open. Further, parts of the Sierra 
Leone/Liberia border are covered by jungle and the many paths that cross the border 
cannot be monitored. Civilians report that lorries regularly pass through borders that 
are loaded, it is suspected, with SALW, as well as drugs, diamonds and other valuable 
resources.74   
 
Third, the targeting of ex-combatants to bring them into civilian life has been 
incomplete and misdirected in some areas of programming. In order to create a secure 
environment within which development can take place it is critical that ex-combatants 
do not return to the gun. However, ex-combatants, particularly civilians in the CDF, 
were not incorporated into the disarmament process and have not been reintegrated or 
received reintegration benefits. This may not seem to be of major concern as many 
CDF fighters remained in their communities during and after the conflict and thus 
theoretically did not need to be reintegrated. But in places such as Bo Town, former 
Kamajor officers remain without worthwhile livelihoods or are impoverished and are 
now receiving no assistance. The former CDF which regards themselves as playing a 
major part in the defeat of the RUF and the protection of civilians from attacks, have 
the capacity to return to conflict or destabilise the government.  
 
Further, some RUF officers did not take up reintegration benefits and were 
impoverished and there are potential ex-combatant Sierra Leonean returnees scattered 
across West Africa.  
 
Many ex-combatants, particularly those in the RUF, were unwilling or unable to 
rejoin rural communities engaged in smallholdings agriculture. And some donors 
were reluctant to commit funds for vocational training when there was a danger that 
ex-combatants might take the money and then return to fighting.75 The closing date 
for registering for reintegration opportunities was June 2002 but it believed that only 
60% of verified ex-combatants actually registered for reintegration opportunities.76  
 
                                                 
73 UN embargoes were imposed on Liberia in 1992 and on Sierra Leone in 1997. The latter was changed to apply 
to only rebel forces in 1998. Human Rights Watch, May 2000, p. 1.  
74 Interviews conducted in Sierra Leone, May-June 2004. 
75 Fanthorpe, February 2003, p. 6. 
76 Fanthorpe, February 2003, p. 13 and p. 7. 
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Bridging the gap between combatants and communities remains a problem area. The 
CRP, React, Stopgaps, and the WfD programmes represent useful attempts to deal 
with the problem of getting ex-combatants and civilians working together and putting 
aside past differences, as well as mopping up some remaining civilian-held weapons 
in communities. However, there are still areas of Sierra Leone where this 
programming does not extend and where the sometimes misdirected reintegration 
efforts initiated during the ‘formal’ DDR process are still being felt. RUF, for 
example, were sent to areas where they had no family connections and skills training 
was sometimes directed towards areas where a needs assessment would have shown 
that there was no demand. It is not clear that alternatives to violence have been 
created for the majority of ex-combatants, many of whom saw taking up arms and 
joining armed groups as a way of surviving or enriching themselves. Ex-combatants 
are also among the poorest groups – a potentially worrying situation. 
 
It was noted in 2002 that:  
 
although it is easy to be critical, there is no doubt that the donor driven rush to 
‘process’ ex-combatants through the DDR scheme has taken little account of 
the differing training needs and de facto reintegration opportunities of a 
socially complex population of former fighters.77  
 
Fourth, vulnerable groups which have been victims of armed violence have not been 
adequately catered for in programming and many of them continue to slide deeper 
into poverty. A criticism of DDR was that combatants’ dependents were not catered 
for during demobilisation and child soldiers, many of whom were abducted or forced 
to fight, after some initial programming, have reached the stage where they are still 
not reintegrated into civilian life, but mainstream child soldier programming has been 
run down.  
 
And groups such as women forced into prostitution, child beggars, and street children, 
and the disabled, are becoming more impoverished in the worsening economic 
situation in Sierra Leone. Women were particularly neglected in the DDR process in 
Sierra Leone and there was also a low participation rate of 5% of women in the 
Stopgap programme, although steps were taken to address this.78 Wives of ex-
combatants were excluded from NCDDR programmes. Future reintegration support 
initiatives need to consider more the psycho-social support needs of women including 
female ex-combatants, wives and female victims of war. Also, specialist programmes 
are required to provide economic, physical and psychological support to help young 
bush wives return to normal life.79 The parties to the conflict often did not disclose the 
presence of girls and child soldiers in their forces, for example, excluding them from 
DDR and complicating post-conflict attempts to redress the balance. Further, children 
were not consulted in programme design and delivery, including their needs and 
priorities.  
 
Fifth, as mentioned above, a key impact of usage has been the psychological and 
social trauma of SALW possession/usage. Little seems to have been done to address 
this outside some services given to ex-combatants. This is by no means 
                                                 
77 Fanthorpe, February 2003, p. 14. 
78 The Stopgap Program, October 2001, p. 15. 
79 UNAMSIL, August 2003, p. 25. 
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straightforward given the huge numbers of people affected by trauma. Almost all 
interviewees from chiefs, down through district officials, to people working in NGOs 
and civilians without livelihoods, openly admitted to being traumatised. Virtually 
every extended family in Sierra Leone has experienced a death or physical injury as a 
result of armed violence. Traditional healing ceremonies have had some impact in 
terms of forgiveness and reintegration of some ex-combatants but civilians appear to 
have been left largely unaided to deal with the psychological consequences of armed 
violence which has left many unable to work or to press ahead and alleviate their 
poverty.  
 
Sixth, it is not evident that DDR and SALW and related programming has fully 
created the sustainable conditions for security as a precursor of development. With so 
many guns potentially in circulation, and ex-combatants neither fully accepted by the 
communities they have returned to (in the case of the RUF), and with many becoming 
increasingly impoverished, and SALW freely available, DDR and SALW 
programming, whatever its contribution to stabilising the situation, has not necessarily 
created sustainable security. The SLP have begun to play a part in confidence-
building and have become less corrupt and more accountable, but the army remains an 
area of concern and is still not trusted by much of the population. It is questionable 
whether the ‘vulnerable’ in society – those without guns during the civil war for 
example – have been empowered over those who accrued powers such as militia 
leaders and officers in the various factions. 
 
For future violence to be averted, there needs to be stronger regional controls of 
weapons flows into Sierra Leone and strong measures taken to avert poverty and a 
resort to SALW as a livelihood provider, or as a means of robbing the population and 
exploiting natural resources. However, collecting the domestically-hidden SALW in 
Sierra Leone remains difficult when many believe violence might break out again and 
some are consequently ensuring they have ready access to weapons for this 
eventuality.  
 
Last, addressing the root causes of conflict and the need, or perceived need, to resort 
to SALW and armed violence, remains a highly problematic undertaking. Donors 
have funded programmes to address the youth issue, good governance, justice, 
mineral and resource exploitation, to single out by a few, but notwithstanding these, 
many of the triggers of armed violence remain. The reform of traditional community 
structures remains a pressing need. Although the position of traditional authority, 
particularly in places like Freetown, has been eroded, in the countryside this is less so. 
Discontent, or even violence, particularly directed by youths, who see traditional 
authority figures securing resources and wealth, cannot be discounted. Nor can further 
violent protests be ruled out against the government, which is widely seen as not 
fulfilling expectations that a new less corrupt and equitable era was unfolding in 2002.  
 
Overall, programming in Sierra Leone seems to have been directed at the right kind of 
targets, although the delivery of some programming has been tardy, but it is not well-
resourced or long-term enough (even though it is large by the standards of resources 
usually directed at Africa) to fully reverse conflict impacts on poverty and remains 
potentially vulnerable to being undermined by a return to armed violence. Further, the 
psychological and social changes engendered by SALW usage and armed violence 
may have been under-estimated, although they are admittedly difficult to reverse and 
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need a long-term commitment. The contribution that local actors, particularly NGOs, 
can make in reversing armed violence impacts has also been under-utilised. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Key points from research findings  
 
 SALW possession enabled the rebels to sustain a campaign of terror, killings, and 
robbery against civilians and the state. SALW enabled them to intimidate, offered 
increased lethality, and suited their ambush and hit-and-run tactics. Communities 
were deeply damaged by chronic insecurity and cycles of violence which 
damaged social capital and compelled many to flee. These impacts are still being 
felt two years after the ending of the conflict.  
 Conversely, much armed violence within Sierra Leone was not committed with 
SALW. Many atrocities in Sierra Leone, and particularly the ones designed to 
have maximum psychological impact (such as amputations and mutilation) were 
committed with traditional weapons or other instruments or implements. Further, 
the CDF managed to make a major contribution to defeating the RUF fighting 
with only limited SALW.  
 SALW-induced insecurity contributed significantly in direct and indirect ways to 
impoverishment. First, SALW possession enabled rebels to destroy infrastructure 
and social services thus damaging the health and livelihoods of much of the 
population. Second, they forced civilians to flee at gunpoint from rural and urban 
areas and abandon their possessions and their occupations. Most have not been 
able to return to the same level of income they had before the conflict. Third, 
social capital was damaged by SALW violence both in cities and the countryside 
with the result that traditional solidarities have been damaged weakening the 
capacity of Sierra Leone to recover.  Psychological trauma following gun use is 
widespread across Sierra Leone, both in combatants and non-combatants. Fourth, 
transportation and trading patterns were altered by armed violence directed at 
lorry drivers. Although there has been a degree of recovery, trade has not returned 
to pre-conflict levels thus contributing to a general impoverishment. Fifth, 
vulnerable groups have suffered disproportionately from the impact of armed 
violence. 
 It is difficult to disentangle precisely the impact of SALW, as opposed to armed 
violence generally, on poverty due to a lack of data and the fact that other 
variables impact upon poverty, such as poor governance, lack of justice, and 
corruption.  Some of the findings here are inferred, although direct evidence 
through interviewing and data was also amassed.  
 In terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from SALW possession during the civil 
conflict, it is clear that the majority of people have been impoverished by their 
direct and indirect impacts. Most combatants were poorer at the conclusion of the 
conflict than they had been at the beginning, and are even poorer now. Most ex-
combatants are now unemployed. Similarly, the poor have become poorer and 
large numbers of professional people have seen their incomes shrink to a much 
lower level than before the war. Vulnerable groups, including women, were 
particularly targeted by combatants for abuse and their position has worsened in 
terms of impoverishment following the conflict. The main ‘winners’ in terms of 
enriching themselves have been people in positions of power in the government, 
the army, and those with connections with them, those engaged in the exploitation 
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of economic resources, and to a lesser extent those who had high level rebel 
connections. Members of the various coups are known to have amassed riches, 
and many government ministers and officials are thought to have considerable 
incomes outside their official ones. Business persons dealing in diamonds and 
mineral resources are known to have enriched themselves during the conflict and 
subsequently. In almost all these cases, armed violence enabled them and 
family/group members to cash in.  The realisation that this is the case and that 
corruption is continuing amongst those in hierarchies is causing considerable 
resentment and could easily be a trigger for future outbursts of armed violence. 
 In Spring 2005, over three years after the official ending of the conflict, the main 
challenge is probably not dealing with the impacts of armed violence, although 
these are substantial, or even in curbing SALW. The main challenge is addressing 
the growing perceptions of much of the population that the authorities and elites 
are failing to turn their back on the corruption of the past and have little empathy 
for the welfare of much of the population, who are becoming more impoverished, 
or in building a more equitable Sierra Leone. In 2002, there was considerable 
hope that a new more equitable era had dawned. When these failed expectations 
are combined with considerable rises in rice prices over the past few years, drastic 
rises in petrol prices in March 2005,80 and the non-availability of mains water, and 
cut backs in electricity supplies, at a time when the international community is 
continuing to invest extremely heavily in Sierra Leone, many people are coming 
to the conclusion that the system, or at least the present government, may be 
unreformable. This opens up the possibility of a degree of popular backing for 
‘unconstitutional’ action. Increasingly, segments of the population have been 
comparing the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)-led government to the All 
Peoples Congress (APC) authoritarian regime and reminiscing about the NPRC 
regime. When UNAMSIL leaves Sierra Leone there are considerable concerns 
regarding violence directed against the state.  
 The potential for armed violence in the short-medium term points to the need for 
monitoring of SALW flows internally and across borders, and in relation to 
returning combatants from West Africa. It also draws attention to the need to 
continue to press ahead with security sector reform in the military and police to 
avoid misuse of SALW and disproportionate use of force against civilians. The 
recent incident when police fired upon demonstrators suggests further work may 
be required in terms of police training. The RSLAF did not become involved in 
the above incident. 
 ‘Positive’ unintended impacts that emerged in the aftermath of armed violence 
include among elements of civil society: a societal aversion to weapons usage, 
possession and display and a desire, if possible, to avoid another catastrophic 
outbreak of armed violence; a new awareness of human rights including gender 
rights; a growth of local NGOs; and among some a rejection of, or desire to 
reform, traditional inequities in power and resources; and, finally, a desire to hold 
the government and army to account for abuses committed during the conflict. 
However, there are few signs that these dynamics have been harnessed to 
materially improve the position of the poor or those who have become more 
impoverished.   
 
                                                 
80 In mid-March 2005 petrol prices in Freetown had virtually doubled on the black market in days as a result of the 
non-availability of petrol through official channels. On 14 March, petrol was selling at around £3 a gallon on the 
black market.  
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Responding to SALW possession/usage  
 
The experience of Sierra Leone suggests that the following elements may usefully be 
integrated into future programming that takes armed violence into account: 
 
 Community security and confidence-building. Unprotected communities 
particularly suffered the consequences of SALW and were impoverished. This 
implies the need for appropriately trained police and army contingents (through 
SSR) that fulfil their duty to protect civilians and communities.  
 International/regional SALW controls. Improved international and regional 
controls over licit and illicit arms transfers to conflict zones. 
 National legislation/regulations on SALW. Further measures are required in this 
area to ensure that controls on small arms keep in check potentially rising levels of 
arms criminality and outbreaks of armed violence. 
 Comprehensive regional/localised arms collection. The latter needs to particularly 
target civilian weapons. Regionally co-ordinated arms collection programmes are 
vital to avert the intensification or potential resurgence of armed violence through 
intra-regional arms circulations. 
 Improved border patrols to combat illicit trafficking of SALW. 
 More targeted interventions to secure livelihoods for ex-combatants. 
Opportunities/needs assessments are particularly important in relation to this to 
avoid the poor targeting that has sometimes been associated with DDR. 
 Build upon civil society capacities to reverse gun cultures and the militarization of 
communities/societies. Civil society and locals have the best understanding of how 
armed violence comes about and the capacity to engage with it through traditional 
mechanisms. This needs to be built upon. In Sierra Leone, community re-
acceptance of ex-combatants has been relatively high, despite the atrocities that 
have been committed. DDR and other forms of programming still do not fully 
engage with the capacities of locals to reverse the militarization of communities, 
although AfD programming is making progress in this area. 
 Identify and target vulnerable groups. Vulnerable groups such as the disabled, 
children, and women were not adequately provided for in much DDR and 
associated programming. They continue to be disadvantaged three years after the 
ending of the conflict. They continue to be disadvantaged three years after the 
ending of the conflict and need continuing or further support. 
 Root causes of weapons acquisition need to be addressed. Sierra Leone shows that 
the targeting of conflict triggers, such as poor governance, corruption, and 
exclusion, are vital if an increasing demand for SALW is not to emerge some time 
in the future. This may take the form of SALW acquisition for armed robbery as 
poverty rises, or arms acquisition for protection purposes, or to further political 
objectives. 
 Poverty issues. A major priority is addressing the increasing poverty in Sierra 
Leone in order to prevent potential outbreaks of popular discontent and armed 
violence. One lesson that emergences from Sierra Leone is that prioritising 
poverty reduction during DDR/SALW programming is essential to assist in 
preventing individuals such as ex-combatants becoming recruits to future armed 
violence. 
 Linking security and development. In Sierra Leone, as in other post-conflict 
contexts, there was a lack of connection between the security and developmental 
components of DDR. SALW programming, such as AfD programmes, have 
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addressed some of those gaps but the need to strengthen these linkages is 
paramount in armed violence and poverty programming.  
 Promoting participatory programming. In Sierra Leone, much SALW/DDR 
and other programming has typically been externally-driven. This has 
contributed to the government failing to take responsibility and ownership for 
taking Sierra Leone forward in addressing armed violence and poverty issues, 
preferring to rely instead on the interventions of the international community. 
Sierra Leone institutions have not generally proved effective in taking the lead 
on this. Nevertheless, participatory programming is vital as international 
donors and international organisations will not remain in Sierra Leone 
indefinitely. Civil society organisations may give an entry point to enhance 
participatory programming, along the lines suggested above. 
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